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Securitization and mortgage default

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  • Ronel Elul

Abstract

We find that private-securitized loans perform worse than observably similar, nonsecuritized loans, which provides evidence for adverse selection. The effect of securitization is strongest for prime mortgages, which have not been studied widely in the previous literature and particular prime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs): These become delinquent at a 30 percent higher rate when privately securitized. By contrast, our baseline estimates for subprime mortgages show that private-securitized loans default at lower rates. We show, however, that ?early defaulting loans? account for this: those that were so risky that they defaulted before they could be securitized. This version supersedes WP 09-21.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronel Elul, 2015. "Securitization and mortgage default," Working Papers 15-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:15-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Alper Kara & David Marques‐Ibanez & Steven Ongena, 2019. "Securitization and credit quality in the European market," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 25(2), pages 407-434, March.
    3. Viral V. Acharya & Stephen G. Ryan, 2016. "Banks’ Financial Reporting and Financial System Stability," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 277-340, May.
    4. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "Do reputable issuers provide better-quality securitizations?," Working Paper Series 2236, European Central Bank.
    5. Joseph L. Breeden & Jose J. Canals-Cerda, 2016. "Consumer risk appetite, the credit cycle, and the housing bubble," Working Papers 16-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    6. Donou-Adonsou, Ficawoyi & Basnet, Hem C., 2019. "Credit card delinquency: How much is the Internet to blame?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 481-497.
    7. Solomon Y. Deku & Alper Kara & Nodirbek Karimov, 2021. "Do investors value frequent issuers in securitization?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 1247-1282, November.
    8. Alper Kara & David Marques-Ibanez & Steven Ongena, 2015. "Securitization and Credit Quality," International Finance Discussion Papers 1148, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. Glennon, Dennis & Kiefer, Hua & Mayock, Tom, 2018. "Measurement error in residential property valuation: An application of forecast combination," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-29.
    10. Kyle Herkenhoff & Lee Ohanian, 2019. "The Impact of Foreclosure Delay on U.S. Employment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 63-83, January.
    11. Aganbegyan, Abel (Аганбегян, Абел), 2017. "On Tax Reform [О Налоговой Реформе]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 114-133, February.
    12. Gary B. Gorton, 2016. "The History and Economics of Safe Assets," NBER Working Papers 22210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Zhou, Yifan, 2019. "Securitization, bank behaviour and financial stability: A systematic review of the recent empirical literature," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 245-254.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mortgage default; securitization; adverse selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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