Mortgage loan securitization and relative loan performance
AbstractWe compare the ex ante observable risk characteristics and the default rates of securitized mortgage loans and mortgage loans retained by the original lender. We find that privately securitized loans tend to be riskier and to default at a faster rate than loans securitized with the GSEs and lender-retained loans. However, the differences in default rates across investor types are of secondary importance for explaining mortgage defaults compared to more conventional predictors, such as original loan-to-value ratios and the path for house prices. Privately securitized home mortgages have conditionally higher expected returns than retained loans, suggesting the presence of risk factors that are unobservable but nonetheless at least partially acknowledged by the market.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its series Working Paper Series with number 2009-22.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-RMG-2009-10-31 (Risk Management)
- NEP-URE-2009-10-31 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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