Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Sophisticated monetary policies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andrew Atkeson
  • V. V. Chari
  • Patrick J. Kehoe

Abstract

The Ramsey approach to policy analysis finds the best competitive equilibrium given a set of available instruments. This approach is silent about unique implementation, namely designing policies so that the associated competitive equilibrium is unique. This silence is particularly problematic in monetary policy environments where many ways of specifying policy lead to indeterminacy. We show that sophisticated policies which depend on the history of private actions and which can differ on and off the equilibrium path can uniquely implement any desired competitive equilibrium. A large literature has argued that monetary policy should adhere to the Taylor principle to eliminate indeterminacy. Our findings say that adherence to the Taylor principle on these grounds is unnecessary. Finally, we show that sophisticated policies are robust to imperfect information.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/common/pub_detail.cfm?pb_autonum_id=1118
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/WP/WP659.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Working Papers with number 659.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:659

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 90 Hennepin Avenue, P.O. Box 291, Minneapolis, MN 55480-0291
Phone: (612) 204-5000
Web page: http://minneapolisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/

Related research

Keywords: Monetary policy ; Taylor's rule;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bennett T. McCallum, 1982. "Price Level Determinacy with an Interest Rate Policy Rule and Rational Expectations," NBER Working Papers 0559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Bernardino Adão & Isabel Correia & Pedro Teles, 2004. "Monetary policy with single instrument feedback rules," Working Paper Series WP-04-30, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  4. Marco Bassetto, 2002. "A Game-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2167-2195, November.
  5. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1981. "Speculative hyperinflations in a maximizing models: can we rule them out?," International Finance Discussion Papers 195, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  6. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
  7. David Backus & John Driffill, 1984. "Inflation and Reputation," Working Papers 560, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. John H. Cochrane, 2007. "Determinacy and Identification with Taylor Rules," NBER Working Papers 13409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1983. "Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing Models: Can We Rule Them Out?," Scholarly Articles 12491027, Harvard University Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Minneapolis Redux
    by Stephen Williamson in Stephen Williamson: New Monetarist Economics on 2013-12-22 22:47:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Francesco Bianchi & Leonardo Melosi, 2013. "Dormant Shocks and Fiscal Virtue," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2013, Volume 28, pages 1-46 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Simone Bertoli & Jesus Fernandez-Huertas Moraga & Francesc Ortega, 2010. "Immigration Policies and the Ecuadorian Exodus," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 1001, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
  3. Bertoli, Simone & Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús, 2012. "Visa Policies, Networks and the Cliff at the Border," IZA Discussion Papers 7094, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Sánchez-Fung, José R., 2011. "Estimating monetary policy reaction functions for emerging market economies: The case of Brazil," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1730-1738, July.
  5. Bernardino Adao & Isabel Correia & Pedro Teles, 2011. "Unique Monetary Equilibria with Interest Rate Rules," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(3), pages 432-442, July.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:659. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Janelle Ruswick).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.