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The role of a CAMEL downgrade model in bank surveillance

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Author Info
R. Alton Gilbert
Andrew P. Meyer
Mark D. Vaughan
Abstract

This article examines the potential contribution to bank supervision of a model designed to predict which banks will have their supervisory ratings downgraded in future periods. Bank supervisors rely on various tools of off-site surveillance to track the condition of banks under their jurisdiction between on-site examinations, including econometric models. One of the models that the Federal Reserve System uses for surveillance was estimated to predict bank failures. Because bank failures have been so rare during the last decade, the coefficients on this model have been "frozen" since 1991. Each quarter the surveillance staff at the Board of Governors provide the supervision staff in the Reserve Banks the probabilities of failure by the banks subject to Fed supervision, based on the coefficients of this bank failure model and the latest call report data for each bank. The number of banks downgraded to problem status in recent years has been substantially larger than the number of bank failures. During a period of few bank failures, the relevance of this bank failure model for surveillance depends to some extent on the accuracy of the model in predicting which banks will have their supervisory ratings downgraded to problem status in future periods. This paper compares the ability of two models to predict downgrades of supervisory ratings to problem status: the Board staff model, which was estimated to predict bank failures, and a model estimated to predict downgrades of supervisory ratings. We find that both models do about as well in predicting downgrades of supervisory ratings for the early 1990s. Over time, however, the ability of the downgrade model to predict downgrades improves relative to that of the model estimated to predict failures. This pattern reflects the value of using a model for surveillance that can be re-estimated frequently. We conclude that the downgrade model may prove to be a useful supplement to the Board's model for estimating failures during periods when most banks are healthy, but that the downgrade model should not be considered a replacement for the current surveillance framework.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Working Papers with number 2000-021.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Publication status: Published in Prompt Corrective Action Ten Years Later, New York, JAI/Elsevier Press (Can Feedback From the Jumbo CD Market Improve Off-Site Surveillance of Community Banks?)
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2000-021

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Keywords: Bank supervision;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rebel A. Cole & Jeffery W. Gunther, 1995. "FIMS: a new monitoring system for banking institutions," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Jan, pages 1-15.
  2. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 1999. "The role of supervisory screens and econometric models in off-site surveillance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 31-56. [Downloadable!]
  3. Beverly J. Hirtle & Jose A. Lopez, 1999. "Supervisory information and the frequency of bank examinations," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 1-20. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2001. "Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields, risk-based capital, and examination ratings," Working Paper 2001-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Anca Pruteanu-Podpiera & Jiří Podpiera, 2008. "The Czech transition banking sector instability: the role of operational cost management," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 209-219, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2003. "Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action," Working Paper Series WP-03-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Donald Morgan & Adam Ashcraft, 2003. "Using Loan Rates to Measure and Regulate Bank Risk: Findings and an Immodest Proposal," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 181-200, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Anca Podpiera & Jiri Podpiera, 2005. "Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure," Working Papers 2005/06, Czech National Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alberto Jaramillo & Adriana Ángel Jiménez & Andrea Restrepo Ramírez & Ana Consuelo Serrano, 2002. "Sector bancario y coyuntura económica. El caso colombiano 1990-2000," Grupo de estudios en economía y empresa 003921, EAFIT-GRUPO DE ESTUDIOS EN ECONOMIA Y EMPRESA (GEE). [Downloadable!]
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