Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields, risk-based capital, and examination ratings
AbstractRecently there have been a number of recommendations to increase the role of subordinated debt (SND) in satisfying bank capital requirements as a preferred means to discipline the risk-taking behavior of systemically important banks. One such proposal recommended using SND yield spreads as the triggers for mandatory supervisory action under prompt corrective action guidelines introduced in U.S. banking legislation in the early 1990s. Currently such action is prompted by bank capital ratios. Evidence from previous research suggests that yield information may be a better predictor of bank problems. This paper empirically analyzes potential costs and benefits of using SND signals to trigger prompt corrective action.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.
Volume (Year): 26 (2002)
Issue (Month): 5 (May)
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- Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2001. "Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields, risk-based capital, and examination ratings," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2001-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
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