Computationally convenient distributional assumptions for common value auctions
AbstractAlthough the mathematical foundations of common value auctions have been well understood since Milgrom & Weber (1982), equilibrium bidding strategies are computationally complex. Very few calculated examples can be found in the literature, and only for highly specialized cases. This paper introduces two sets of distributional assumptions that are flexible enough for theoretical and empirical applications and yet permit straightforward calculation of equilibrium bidding strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 1997-5.
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Gordy, Michael B, 1998. "Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common-Value Auctions," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 12(1), pages 61-78, August.
- Michael Gordy & Margaret Kyle, 1997. "MATLAB/C code for GIG and BNLG common value auction specifications," Matlab codes gigbnlg, .
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
- Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1991. "Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 370-75, March.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
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9202, Southern California - Department of Economics.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Vuong, Quang, 1993. "Structural econometric analysis of descending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 329-341, April.
- Laffont, J.J. & Vuong, Q., 1992. "Structural Econometrics Analysis of Descending Auctions," Papers 92.272, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "On the Non-Existence of Multiplicative Equilibrium Bidding Strategies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 523, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- John K. Horowitz & Lori Lynch & Andrew Stocking, 2009.
"Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis of Farmland Preservation in Maryland,"
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 85(4), pages 555-575.
- Horowitz, John K. & Lynch, Lori & Stocking, Andrew, 2007. "Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis of Farmland Preservation in Maryland," Working Papers 7340, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
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