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Computationally convenient distributional assumptions for common value auctions

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Author Info
Michael B. Gordy

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Abstract

Although the mathematical foundations of common value auctions have been well understood since Milgrom & Weber (1982), equilibrium bidding strategies are computationally complex. Very few calculated examples can be found in the literature, and only for highly specialized cases. This paper introduces two sets of distributional assumptions that are flexible enough for theoretical and empirical applications and yet permit straightforward calculation of equilibrium bidding strategies.

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Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 1997-5.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:1997-5

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions Econometrics

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Vuong, Quang, 1993. "Structural econometric analysis of descending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 329-341, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "On the Non-Existence of Multiplicative Equilibrium Bidding Strategies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 523, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1991. "Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 370-75, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-26.


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