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Structural Econometrics Analysis of descending Auctions

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Author Info
Laffont, J.J.
Vuong, Q.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Southern California - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 9202.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:socaec:9202

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 90089-0152 U.S.A.
Phone: (213) 740-8335
Fax: (213) 740-8543
Web page: http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/economics/
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Related research
Keywords: econometrics ; economic models;

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  1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  2. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1997. "Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity," NBER Working Papers 6269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Michael B. Gordy, 1997. "Computationally convenient distributional assumptions for common value auctions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-5, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. repec:att:wimass:1920013 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Véronique Flambard & Pierre Lasserre & Pierre Mohnen, 2004. "Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, Informational Rents, and Procurement Management," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-59, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Bernard Elyakime & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrice Loisel & Quang Vuong, 1994. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 34, pages 05, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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