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Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret

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  • Patrice Loisel
  • Bernard Elyakime

Abstract

[fre] Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret. . Les bois sont le plus souvent vendus en France par enchères avec prix de retrait secret. Celles-ci peuvent être raisonnablement modélisées dans le cadre de la valeur privée. Avec des acheteurs supposés symétriques, le vendeur a alors intérêt à annoncer son prix de retrait. Les acheteurs n'étant pas tous de même type, ce résultat est-il encore vrai ? Pour cela nous proposons un modèle d'enchères asymétriques à valeurs privées, sans annonce du prix de retrait du vendeur. Nous nous limitons à deux acheteurs, un de chaque type, pour déterminer l'espérance d'utilité du vendeur et la comparer à celle d'un modèle à prix de retrait public. Nous montrons que ce dernier modèle procure la plus grande espérance d'utilité au vendeur. Une hypothèse explicative du prix de retrait secret est alors proposée en conclusion. [eng] Asymetric auctions with secret reservation prices . . We examine a first-price sealed-bid auction in which the seller's reservation price is not announced in advance, and in which buyers are not symetrie. We pro­pose a model in private value of these auctions with a secret seller's price reservation. We study this model with only two buyers : one of each type. So we can compute numerically bidders'strategies and we evaluate the expected gain for the seller in this model and in the model with a public reservation price. This last one has the higher expected gain. Another possible explanation is given to the secret reservation price in wood-auctions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 48 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 835-851

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_4_409918

Note: DOI:10.2307/3502702
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco

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Cited by:
  1. Patrice Loisel & Bernard Elyakime, 1998. "Un modèle d'enchères de bois sur pied," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 93-101.

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