This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Antonio Miralles (Universitat de Barcelona)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidders expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes stronger, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively weaker, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ere.ub.es/dtreball/E05132.rdf/at_download/file
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 132.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2005132

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
Web page: http://www.ere.ub.es
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Espai de Recerca en Economia).

Related research
Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Stegeman, Mark, 1996. "Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 228-259, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kaplan, Todd & Sela, Aner, 2003. "Auctions with Private Entry Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Armstrong, Mark, 2000. "Optimal Multi-object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 455-81, July.
  7. Svetlana Pevnitskaya, 2003. "Endogenous Entry in First-Price Private Value Auctions: the Self-Selection Effect," Working Papers 03-03, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard, 1993. "Optimal Auctions Revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 227-239, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gandal, Neil, 1997. "Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(3), pages 227-44, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "Privatization in the United States," NBER Working Papers 5113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All the bibliographic data shown here has been contributed by volunteers, thereby helping to keep this service free.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.