Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries
AbstractFor sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development of new, climate friendly technologies that reduce the costs of abatement. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries of their willingness to pay for emission reductions. Increased willingness to pay for emissions reductions for any group of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in aggregate willingness to pay on equilibrium emissions is ambiguous.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2013.07.
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Technology Agreement; Coalition Stability; Climate; International Agreement;
Other versions of this item:
- Hoel, Michael & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2013. "Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries," Memorandum 02/2013, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2013-03-16 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-ENE-2013-03-16 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-03-16 (Environmental Economics)
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