Universality of Nash Components
AbstractWe show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game — a common interest game whose common payoff to the players is at most equal to one—whose success set (the set of strategy profiles where the maximal payoff of one is indeed achieved) is homeomorphic to the given polyhedral set. Since compact semi-algebraic sets can be triangulated, a similar result follows for the collection of connected compact semi-algebraic sets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1205.
Date of creation: 2012
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Strategic form games; Nash equilibrium; Nash component; topology.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-10-27 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-10-27 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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