Free-Riding-Proof International Environmental Agreements
AbstractWe study international free-riding-proof coalitions to solve trans-boundary environmental problems such as global warming. We show that the free-riding problem is rather serious so that a free-riding-proof coalition can consist of only a small number of countries. In the optimal coalitional structure, therefore, the world would be divided into many small groups. For each group, if countries are symmetric, their individual incentives to join a group are identical across the two regimes of environmental coalitions: the non-transferable utility (NTU) regime and transferable utility (TU) regime. If member countries are asymmetric, however, groups are more stable under the TU regime than under the NTU regime since the former regime enables the member countries to pool their incentives. International cooperation (within each group) on carbon taxes is shown to be equivalent to the NTU regime, while emission permit trading is shown to be equivalent to the TU regime. Therefore, the emission permit trading system can be considered to be superior in the world of asymmetric countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in its series Discussion papers with number 11043.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-04-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-04-30 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-04-30 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Taiji Furusawa & Hideo Konishi, 2010.
"Contributing or Free-Riding? Voluntary Participation in a Public Good Economy,"
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
gd09-128, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Konishi, Hideo & Furusawa, Taiji, 2011. "Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
- Taiji Furusawa & Hideo Konishi, 2008. "Contributing or Free-Riding? Voluntary Participation in a Public Good Economy," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 681, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 04 Aug 2010.
- FURUSAWA Taiji & KONISHI Hideo, 2011. "Contributing or Free-Riding? Voluntary Participation in a Public Good Economy," Discussion papers 11028, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- David McEvoy & John Stranlund, 2009. "Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 42(4), pages 491-508, April.
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