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Managing the Evolution of Cooperation

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  • Julian Dormann
  • Thomas Ehrmann
  • Michael Kopel

Abstract

Management scholars have long stressed the importance of evolutionary processses for inter-firm cooperation but have mostly missed the promising opportunity to incorporate ideas from evolutionary theories into the analysis of collaborative arrangements. In this paper, we first present three rules for the evolution of cooperation - kinship selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. Second, we apply our theoretical considerations, enriched with ideas from cultural anthropology, to the context of a specific and particularly attractive type of cooperative arrangement, the franchise form of organization. Third, we provide a preliminary empirical test with regards to conditions under which evolutionary modes can secure cooperative behavior. We conclude by summarizing our results and deriving fertile areas for further research.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2008-01.

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Date of creation: Jan 2008
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Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2008-01

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Keywords: Length 46 pages;

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  1. Dilip Abreu & Paul Milgrom & David Pearce, 1997. "Information and timing in repeated partnerships," Levine's Working Paper Archive 636, David K. Levine.
  2. Francine Lafontaine, 1992. "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
  3. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
  4. Mark Granovetter, 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 33-50, Winter.
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  7. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Alexander Peterhansl & Peter S. Dodds & Duncan J. Watts, 2007. "Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 53(7), pages 1036-1050, July.
  8. Stephen P. Borgatti & Rob Cross, 2003. "A Relational View of Information Seeking and Learning in Social Networks," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 49(4), pages 432-445, April.
  9. Eric Alden Smith & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Costly Signaling and Cooperation," Working Papers, Santa Fe Institute 00-12-071, Santa Fe Institute.
  10. Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
  11. Ray Reagans & Linda Argote & Daria Brooks, 2005. "Individual Experience and Experience Working Together: Predicting Learning Rates from Knowing Who Knows What and Knowing How to Work Together," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 51(6), pages 869-881, June.
  12. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring/ The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," Working Papers, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis ir98040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
  13. Michael, Steven C., 1996. "To franchise or not to franchise: An analysis of decision rights and organizational form shares," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 57-71, January.
  14. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
  15. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  16. Robin Cowan & Nicolas Jonard & Jean-Benoit Zimmermann, 2007. "Bilateral Collaboration and the Emergence of Innovation Networks," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 53(7), pages 1051-1067, July.
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