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Inter-Organisationale Ausgestaltung der Entscheidungszentralisierung und produktive Effizienz: Eine empirische Analyse am Beispiel des Franchising

Author

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  • Thomas Ehrmann

    (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster)

  • Julian Dormann

    (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Beziehung zwischen der Zentralisierung von Entscheidungsmacht und der produktiven Effizienz von Business-Format-Franchisenetzwerken. Auf Grundlage einer Stichprobe von 83 deutschen Systemen erfolgen mithilfe der Data Envelopment Analysis zunächst konkrete Effizienzmessungen. Hierauf aufbauend zeigt sich ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen Zentralisierungsgrad und Netzwerkeffizienz. Weitgehend konsistent mit Vorhersagen der positiven Agency-Theorie finden sich Hinweise darauf, dass die Intensität dieses Zusammenhangs durch die Verteilung spezifischer Wissensressourcen und durch den Einsatz von Anreizmechanismen bestimmt wird.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Ehrmann & Julian Dormann, 2008. "Inter-Organisationale Ausgestaltung der Entscheidungszentralisierung und produktive Effizienz: Eine empirische Analyse am Beispiel des Franchising," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 60(4), pages 326-354, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:60:y:2008:i:4:d:10.1007_bf03372797
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372797
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    L14; L23; M21;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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