Performance in distribution systems : What is the influence of the upstream firm’s organizational choices ?
AbstractThis paper studies the performance of distribution networks as the result of a range of organizational choices made by the upstream firm. The analytical part of the paper surveys the vast literature devoted to franchising and to dual distribution. From this framework, several testable propositions are derived, linking the networks performance to the organizational choices. Three complementary criteria of performance are taken into account : the internationalization rate, the expansion rate, the market share. The paper provides evidence that these criteria are empirically related. Thus, a system of simultaneous equations is defined, free of endogeneity relating to the explanatory variables. The estimations on recent French data by means of the three-least squares method provide robust results, and show that the type of distribution network, the number of company-owned units in the network, the type of sector, and the choice to manage several networks simultaneously affect the performance in distribution systems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 1224.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
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Franchising; Organizational choices; Endogeneity; Simultaneous Equations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-09-16 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CSE-2012-09-16 (Economics of Strategic Management)
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