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Ownership and Control Rights in Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999

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  • Elfenbein, Daniel W
  • Lerner, Josh

Abstract

We examine the structure of more than 100 alliances by Internet portals and other firms between 1995 to 1999 from a contract-theory perspective. Models of incomplete contracts frequently invoke unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts, and the cost of enforcing contracts in justifying the assumption of incompleteness. The setting in which Internet portals formed alliances was rife with these sorts of transaction costs. We argue that these alliances can be viewed as incomplete contracts and find that the division of ownership and the allocation of control rights are consistent with the incomplete-contracting literature. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 34 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 356-69

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:2:p:356-69

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Cited by:
  1. Panico, Claudio, 2012. "Control and contract design in research collaborations: A complete contract perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 459-470.
  2. Andreas Roider, 2004. "Asset Ownership and Contractibility of Interaction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 787-802, Winter.
  3. F. Andrew Hanssen & James W. Meehan, Jr. & Thomas J. Miceli, 2012. "Explaining Changes in Organizational Form: The Case of Professional Baseball," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2012-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  4. Carolin Haeussler & Matthew J. Higgins, 2012. "Explaining Preferences for Control Rights in Strategic Alliances: A Property Rights and Capabilities Perspective Approach," NBER Working Papers 18364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Bodnaruk, Andriy & Massa, Massimo & Simonov, Andrei, 2013. "Alliances and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 671-693.
  6. Belderbos, René & Cassiman, Bruno & Faems, Dries & Leten, Bart & Van Looy, Bart, 2014. "Co-ownership of intellectual property: Exploring the value-appropriation and value-creation implications of co-patenting with different partners," Research Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 841-852.
  7. Beshears, John, 2013. "The performance of corporate alliances: Evidence from oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 324-346.

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