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On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

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Author Info
Andrea Morone
Serena Sandri
Tobias Uske ()

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Abstract

Theory absorption, a notion introduced by Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972) and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004), discusses the problem whether a theory can survive its own acceptance. Whereas this holds for strategic equilibria according to the assumptions on which they are based, the problem if theories are absorbable by at most boundedly rational decision makers is hardly discussed. Based on guessing game experiments we discuss the requirements of equilibrium theory absorption and test experimentally the effects of informing none, some or all players about how to derive equilibrium predictions.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2006-33.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2006-33

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Related research
Keywords: theory absorption guessing game p-beauty contest individual behaviour elimination of dominated strategies

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2004. "Bounded Rationality and Theory Absorption," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-27, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Duffy, John & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1997. "On the Robustness of Behaviour in Experimental "Beauty Contest" Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1684-1700, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2007. "Guessing Games and People Behaviours: What Can we Learn?," series 0015, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche - Università di Bari, revised Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
  5. W. Güth & M. Kocher & M. Sutter, . "Experimental Beauty Contests with Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Players and with Interior and Boundary Equilibria," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2001-45, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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  6. Ben Greiner, 2004. "The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics," Working Paper Series in Economics 10, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Weber, Roberto A., 2003. "'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 134-144, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Morone, Andrea & Fiore, Annamaria & Sandri, Serena, 2008. "On The Absorbability Of Herd Behaviour And Informational Cascades: An Experimental Analysis," MPRA Paper 6884, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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