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Persuading skeptics and reaffirming believers

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  • Alonso, Ricardo
  • Câmara, Odilon

Abstract

In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a signal. We characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by a signal, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to benefit from information control. We examine a class of models with no value of information control under common priors, and show that a sender generically benefits from information control under heterogeneous priors. We extend our analysis to cases where the receiver’s prior is unknown to the sender.

Suggested Citation

  • Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2014. "Persuading skeptics and reaffirming believers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58680, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:58680
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58680/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2018. "On the value of persuasion by experts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 103-123.
    2. Joanna Franaszek, 2021. "When Competence Hurts: Revelation of Complex Information," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 5-23.
    3. Xie, Yinxi & Xie, Yang, 2017. "Machiavellian experimentation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 685-711.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    persuasion; information control; heterogeneous priors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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