The provision of quality in a bilateral search market
AbstractWe accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon -even in the limit as search frictions disappear.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 86.
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
quality dispersion; Nash Program; bilateral search.;
Other versions of this item:
- Clara Ponsat?Author-Email: Clara.email@example.com & J?sef S?ovics, 2002. "The provision of quality in a bilateral search market," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 534.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-03-14 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sakovics, J. & Ponsati, C., 1995. "Rubinstein Batgaining with Tow-Sided Options," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 318.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Bester, Helmut, 1993. "Bargaining versus Price Competition in Markets with Quality Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 278-88, March.
- Bester,Helmut, 1986.
"Bargaining,Search costs and equilibrium price distribution,"
Discussion Paper Serie A
49, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Bester, Helmut, 1988. "Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 201-14, April.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gina Reddie).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.