This paper analyzes and structurally estimates a synchronization game. Agents take part in an activity and benefit from the participation of others. Coordinated actions are fruit of correlated effects as well as endogenous interactions. Standard tools applied in optimal stopping problems for continuous parameter stochastic processes are used but the processes under study are endogenized by making their distribution dependent on the participation of the group. This setup allows for identifiability and separation of correlated and endogenous influences. The model is applied to data on military records for Union Army soldiers during the American
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Estimation C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003.
"Continuous-time Games of Timing,"
Discussion Papers
1363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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