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Social Interactions in a Synchronization Game

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  • Aureo de Paula

Abstract

This paper analyzes and structurally estimates a synchronization game. Agents take part in an activity and benefit from the participation of others. Coordinated actions are fruit of correlated effects as well as endogenous interactions. Standard tools applied in optimal stopping problems for continuous parameter stochastic processes are used but the processes under study are endogenized by making their distribution dependent on the participation of the group. This setup allows for identifiability and separation of correlated and endogenous influences. The model is applied to data on military records for Union Army soldiers during the American

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings with number 277.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:latm04:277

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Keywords: Optimal stopping; social interactions; coordination; econometrics;

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  1. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 2000. "Interactions-Based Models," Working Papers 00-05-028, Santa Fe Institute.
  2. Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165, January.
  3. Araujo, Aloisio & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1978. "Notes on the smoothing of aggregate demand," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 113-127, September.
  4. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, 2003. "Cowards And Heroes: Group Loyalty In The American Civil War," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(2), pages 519-548, May.
  5. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, 2002. "The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women's Career and Marriage Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 730-770, August.
  6. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, 2004. "Shame and Ostracism: Union Army Deserters Leave Home," NBER Working Papers 10425, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Continuous-time Games of Timing," Discussion Papers 1363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2001. "Non-Market Interactions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1914, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik & Jeremy C. Stein, 2001. "Social Interaction and Stock-Market Participation," NBER Working Papers 8358, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Manski, Charles F, 1993. "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 531-42, July.
  11. Cormac O Grada & Morgan Kelly, 2000. "Market Contagion: Evidence from the Panics of 1854 and 1857," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1110-1124, December.
  12. Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
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