Social Interactions in a Synchronization Game
AbstractThis paper analyzes and structurally estimates a synchronization game. Agents take part in an activity and benefit from the participation of others. Coordinated actions are fruit of correlated effects as well as endogenous interactions. Standard tools applied in optimal stopping problems for continuous parameter stochastic processes are used but the processes under study are endogenized by making their distribution dependent on the participation of the group. This setup allows for identifiability and separation of correlated and endogenous influences. The model is applied to data on military records for Union Army soldiers during the American
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings with number 277.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Optimal stopping; social interactions; coordination; econometrics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-30 (All new papers)
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