Legitimacy, Local Participation, and Compliance in the Galapagos Marine Reserve
AbstractWe analyze the compliance behavior of the small-scale fishery boat-owners of the Galapagos Marine Reserve. Our empirical analysis considers aspects related to the participatory management system of the reserve as determinant factors of the decision to violate the regulations. The econometric results indicate that, along with surveillance and fines, the level of legitimacy that norms have among the boat-owners, the sense of belonging of individuals, the legitimacy of their local organizations, as well as their participation levels in these organizations are additional determinant factors in the decision to transgress the agreed regulations. Policy recommendation to improve compliance are also discussed
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings with number 168.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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local participation; compliance; legitimacy; natural resource management.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
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- Aaron Hatcher & Shabbar Jaffry & Olivier Thébaud & Elizabeth Bennett, 2000. "Normative and Social Influences Affecting Compliance with Fishery Regulations," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 76(3), pages 448-461.
- William J. Furlong, 1991. "The Deterrent Effect of Regulatory Enforcement in the Fishery," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 67(1), pages 116-129.
- Bardhan, Pranab, 1993. "Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 633-639, April.
- Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000.
"Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out,"
Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October.
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas & John Stranlund & Cleve Willis, 2000. "Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out," Artefactual Field Experiments 00028, The Field Experiments Website.
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