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Cost-Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparisonof Simple Mechanisms

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  • Moulin, Herve

Abstract

A technology with descreasing marginal costs is used by agents with equal rights. Each agent demands a quantity of output and costs are divided by means of a fixed formula. Several such mechanisms are compared for the existence of Nash equilibrium demand profiles and for the equity properties of these equilibria. Among three mechanisms, average cost pricing, the Shapley-Shubnik cost sharing and serial cost-sharing, only the latter two possess at least one Nash equilibrium at a reasonable domain of individual preferences. Only the serial cost sharing equilibria pass the equity tests of No Envy and Stand Alone cost.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Duke University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 95-19.

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Date of creation: 1995
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Publication status: Published in GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Vol. 13, 1996, pages 225-251
Handle: RePEc:duk:dukeec:95-19

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Postal: Department of Economics Duke University 213 Social Sciences Building Box 90097 Durham, NC 27708-0097
Phone: (919) 660-1800
Fax: (919) 684-8974
Web page: http://econ.duke.edu/

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Cited by:
  1. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 2001. "Mixed serial cost sharing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 51-68, January.
  2. Cyril Téjédo & Michel Truchon, 2002. "Monotonicity and Bounds for Cost Shares under the Path Serial Rule," Cahiers de recherche 02-05, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
  3. Flam, S. D. & Jourani, A., 2003. "Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 44-56, April.
  4. Téjédo, Cyril & Truchon, Michel, 2001. "Serial Cost Sharing in Multidimensional Contexts," Cahiers de recherche 0108, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  5. Cyril Téjédo & Michel Truchon, 2001. "Serial Cost Sharing in Multidimensional Contexts (May 2002 revised version)," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-68, CIRANO.
  6. Koster, M., 2005. "Cost Sharing, Differential Games, and the Moulin-Shenker Rule," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-07, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  7. Koster, M.A.L., 1998. "Multi-Service Serial Cost Sharing: An Incompatibility with Smoothness," Discussion Paper 1998-122, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Koster, M.A.L., 1998. "Multi-Service Serial Cost Sharing: A Characterization of the Moulin-Shenker Rule," Discussion Paper 1998-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Federico Quartieri, 2013. "Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 553-579, February.
  10. Maurice Koster, 2006. "Heterogeneous cost sharing, the directional serial rule," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 429-444, December.
  11. Koster, M.A.L. & Tijs, S.H. & Borm, P.E.M., 1998. "Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-78039, Tilburg University.

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