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Serial cost sharing in multidimensional contexts

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  • Tejedo, Cyril
  • Truchon, Michel

Abstract

The Serial Cost Sharing Rule was originally conceived for situations where the demands of agents pertain to a homogeneous private good, produced by an unreplicable technology. In this context, it is endowed with a variety of desirable equity and coherency properties. This paper investigates the extension of this rule to the context where agents request many goods that may be public, private or specific to some of them, where the aggregation rule may be very general and where demands may have to be scaled in a non proportional way, more precisely along a path, in order to compute cost shares. It proposes the Path Serial Rule to address these general problems. It then shows which properties and characteristics are satisfied by this rule. Some of them are transposed directly from the single good context to the general one while other must be weakened. More precisely, they are required to hold only on the paths along which demands must be scaled if needed. Nevertheless, some of the characterisations of the serial rule in the single good case do not carry over to the general context. La règle de partage séquentiel des coûts a été conçue à l'origine pour le cas où les demandes des agents portent sur un bien privé homogène, produit par une technologie non reproductible. Dans un tel contexte, cette règle satisfait de nombreuses propriétés d'équité et de cohérence. Dans cet article, on étudie l'extension de cette règle aux cas où les demandes des agents peuvent être des vecteurs qui ne représentent pas forcément des biens homogènes entre les agents, dont l'agrégation ne se fait pas uniquement via la sommation et où les demandes doivent être ajustées de manière non proportionnelle, plus précisément le long d'un sentier, pour le calcul des parts de coût. On montre ensuite quelles sont les propriétés qui sont satisfaites par cette règle ou qui la caractérisent. Certaines sont transposées directement du contexte à un seul bien au contexte général alors que d'autres doivent être
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  • Tejedo, Cyril & Truchon, Michel, 2002. "Serial cost sharing in multidimensional contexts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 277-299, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:44:y:2002:i:3:p:277-299
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cyril Téjédo & Michel Truchon, 2002. "Monotonicity and Bounds for Cost Shares under the Path Serial Rule," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-43, CIRANO.
    2. Koster, Maurice & Tijs, Stef & Borm, Peter, 1998. "Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 229-242, December.
    3. Moulin, Herve, 1996. "Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-251, April.
    4. Sprumont, Yves, 1998. "Ordinal Cost Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 126-162, July.
    5. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-1037, September.
    6. Kolpin, Van, 1996. "Multi-Product Serial Cost Sharing: An Incompatibility with the Additivity Axiom," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 227-233, April.
    7. Moulin Herve & Shenker Scott, 1994. "Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 178-201, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Makdissi & Cyril Téjédo, 2000. "Problèmes d’appariement et politique de l’emploi," Cahiers de recherche 00-04, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    2. Pene Kalulumia & Denis Bolduc, 2004. "Generalized Mixed Estimation Of A Multinomial Discretecontinuous Choice Model For Electricity Demand," Cahiers de recherche 04-01, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    3. John Baldwin & Petr Hanel & David Sabourin, 2000. "Les déterminants des activités d’innovation dans les entreprises de fabrication canadiennes : le rôle des droits de propriété intellectuelle," Cahiers de recherche Statistique Canada No 11F, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    4. Pene Kalulumia, 2002. "Effects of government debt on interest rates: evidence from causality tests in johansen-type models," Cahiers de recherche 02-07, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    5. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    6. Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.
    7. Petr Hanel, 2003. "Impact Of Government Support Programs On Innovation By Canadian Manufacturing Firms," Cahiers de recherche 04-02, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    8. Petr Hanel & Snezana VUCIC, 2002. "L’Impact Économique Des Activités De Recherche De L’Université De Sherbrooke," Cahiers de recherche 02-04, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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