This paper characterizes nonlinear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non-empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy-free core to be non-empty.
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Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
2004:23.
Length: 14 pages Date of creation: 05 Nov 2004 Date of revision:
12 Jan 2006 Publication status: Forthcoming in Metroeconomica, 2006. Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2004_023
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
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