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Optimal Policy and (the Lack of) Time Inconsistency: Insights from Simple Models

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Author Info
Jorge Soares, Marina Azzimonti, Pierre-Daniel Sarte (Department of Economics, University of Iowa)
Pierre-Daniel Sarte () (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond)
Jorge Soares () (Department of Economics,University of Delaware)

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Abstract

In the standard neoclassical model with a representative agent, a benevolent planner who can commit to future policies will, if feasible, levy a single confiscatory tax on capital in the initial period and commit never to set positive taxes thereafter. We show that this policy, which allows for the disposal of distortional taxes entirely, can arise even when sequential governments are unable to credibly promise future tax rates, regardless of how public expenditures are determined.

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File URL: http://www.lerner.udel.edu/economics/WorkingPapers/2006/UDWP2006-08.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Delaware, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 06-08.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dlw:wpaper:06-08

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Related research
Keywords: Capital Taxation Ramsey Commitment Markov-Perfect equilibrium Time consistent policy Overlapping Generations

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Klein, Paul & Krusell, Per & Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor, 2004. "Time Consistent Public Expenditures," CEPR Discussion Papers 4582, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Paul Klein & JosÈ-VÌctor RÌos-Rull, 2003. "Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1217-1245, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Xie, Danyang, 1997. "On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 412-430, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Erosa, Andres & Gervais, Martin, 2002. "Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 338-369, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Mateos-Planas, Xavier, . "Demographics and the politics of capital taxation in a life-cycle economy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0610, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton. [Downloadable!]
  6. Krusell, Per & Kuruscu, Burhanettin & Smith Jr., Anthony A, 2001. "Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting," CEPR Discussion Papers 2693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2001. "The Survival of the Welfare State," Economics Working Papers 603, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-22, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Atkinson, A B & Sandmo, A, 1980. "Welfare Implications of the Taxation of Savings," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(359), pages 529-49, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Jones, Larry E & Manuelli, Rodolfo E & Rossi, Peter E, 1993. "Optimal Taxation in Models of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 485-517, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Renstrom, T., 1999. "Optimal Dynamic Taxation," Discussion Papers 99-21, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  17. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Reis, Catarina, 2006. "Taxation without Commitment," MPRA Paper 2071, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Salvador Ortigueira & Joana Pereira, 2007. "Markov-Perfect Optimal Fiscal Policy: The Case of Unbalanced Budgets," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/41, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
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