A static income tax evasion model à la Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that an increase in the tax rate causes taxpayers to increase their income declaration. In an important contribution, Lin and Yang (2001) obtained exactly the opposite result by extending the Yitzhaki (1974) model to a dynamic one with Ak(t) production technology. In this paper we show that once the Lin and Yang (2001) model becomes fully compatible with the Yitzhaki’s (1974) setting, the negative relationship between taxes and evasion still prevails. We then enrich the dynamic model with a productive public sector, and obtain an ambiguous relationship between taxes and evasion incentives as in Allingham and Sandmo (1972). We also prove that the growth-maximizing share of public expenditures in total output satisfies the natural efficiency condition even in the presence of tax evasion. However, the latter result is not robust to the introduction of the costs associated with income declaration and concealment activities.
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Paper provided by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance in its series Economics Series with number
2008_19.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
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James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998.
"Tax Compliance,"
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American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
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Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002.
"Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470
Elsevier.
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