Technology Adoption in Critical Mass Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence
AbstractWe analyze the choices between two technologies A and B that both exhibit network effects. We introduce a critical mass game in which coordination on either one of the standards constitutes a Nash equilibrium outcome while coordination on standard B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We present a heuristic definition of a critical mass and show that the critical mass is inversely related to the mixed strategy equilibrium. We show that the critical mass is closely related to the risk dominance criterion, the global game theory, and the maximin criterion. We present experimental evidence that both the relative degree of payoff dominance and risk dominance explain players' choices. We finally show that users' adoption behavior induces firms to select a relatively unrisky technology which minimizes the problem of coordination failure to the benefit of consumers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 961.
Length: 40 p.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2010-01-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-01-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2010-01-16 (Network Economics)
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- Keser, Claudia & Suleymanova, Irina & Wey, Christian, 2011.
"Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence,"
DICE Discussion Papers
33, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Keser, Claudia & Suleymanova, Irina & Wey, Christian, 2012. "Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 262-276.
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