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Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion

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Author Info
Rainald Borck

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Abstract

This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.

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File URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.40183.de/dp329.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 329.

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Length: 21 p.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp329

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Related research
Keywords: Tax evasion; redistribution; voting;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
  2. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484.
  3. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Rainald Borck, 2002. "Stricter Enforcement May Increase Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 297, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Alm, James & Sanchez, Isabel & de Juan, Ana, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 3-18.
  6. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Falkinger, Josef, 1991. "On optimal public good provision with tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 127-133, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Traxler, Christian, 2006. "Voting over Taxes: The Case of Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers in Economics 1188, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Jesper Roine, 2006. "The political economics of not paying taxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 107-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Fernandez, Raquel & Rogerson, Richard, 1995. "On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(2), pages 249-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Rainald Borck, 2007. "Voting, Inequality And Redistribution," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(1), pages 90-109, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Roine, Jesper, 1999. "Tax Avoidance, Redistribution and Voting," Research Papers in Economics 2000:1, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Slemrod, Joel, 1994. "Fixing the leak in Okun's bucket optimal tax progressivity when avoidance can be controlled," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 41-51, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
  20. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Feld, Lars P & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2002. "Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2), pages 197-222.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rainald Borck, 2002. "Stricter Enforcement May Increase Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 297, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rainald Borck, 2005. "Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 503, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Rainald Borck, 2004. "Income Tax Evasion and the Penalty Structure," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(5), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
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