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Stricter Enforcement May Increase Tax Evasion

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Rainald Borck

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Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 297.

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Length: 16 p.
Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp297

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alm, James & Sanchez, Isabel & de Juan, Ana, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 3-18.
  2. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sanchez, Isabel & Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 345-369, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Falkinger, Josef, 1991. "On optimal public good provision with tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 127-133, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rainald Borck, 2003. "Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 329, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Roine, Jesper, 1999. "Tax Avoidance, Redistribution and Voting," Research Papers in Economics 2000:1, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Roger H. Gordon & John D. Wilson, 1999. "Tax Structure and Government Behavior: Implications for Tax Policy," NBER Working Papers 7244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Roger H. Gordon & John D. Wilson, 2001. "Expenditure Competition," NBER Working Papers 8189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rainald Borck, 2003. "Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 329, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alejandro Esteller-More, 2004. "Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes," Public Economics 0401001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Rainald Borck, 2004. "Income Tax Evasion and the Penalty Structure," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(5), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
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