The cooperative endorsement of a strategic game
AbstractThis note provides a way to translate a strategic game to a characteristic cooperative game assuming that the set of players of the cooperative game is the set of pure actions of the strategic game. Coalitions generated with only one action for each player and the total coalition characterize the Core. We calculate the worth of the total coalition to guarantee the non-emptyness condition. In particular, for a two-player game, this value is equal to the maximal sum of the diagonals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Valencia, ERI-CES in its series Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour with number 0610.
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Cooperative games; core;
Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-06-26 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Matthew Rabin., 1992.
"Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,"
Economics Working Papers
92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
- M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
- Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, January.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
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