Entry and espionage with noisy signals
AbstractWe analyze industrial espionage in the context of entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent, who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an inaccurate Intelligence System. The Intelligence System generates a noisy signal on incumbent’s actions and the potential entrant decides whether to enter based on this signal. If the precision of the Intelligence System is commonly known, the incumbent will signal-jam to manipulate the distribution of likely signals and hence the entrant’s decisions. Therefore, the incumbent will benefit from his rival’s espionage. In contrast, the spying firm (the entrant) will typically gain if the espionage accuracy is sufficiently high and privately known by her. In this setting, the market will be more competitive under espionage.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Valencia, ERI-CES in its series Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour with number 0113.
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Espionage; Entry; Asymmetric information; Signal-Jamming.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-03-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-03-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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