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Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies

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  • Sudipta Sarangi

    ()

  • Pascal Billand

    ()

  • Christophe Bravard

    ()

  • S. Chakrabarti

    ()

Abstract

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolis- tic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Louisiana State University in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2009-11.

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Handle: RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2009-11

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  1. Sumit Joshi, 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0623, Econometric Society.
  2. Goyal, S. & Joshi, S., 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 9952-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
  3. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
  4. Billand, P. & Bravard, C., 2004. "Non-cooperative networks in oligopolies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 593-609, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Alex Barrachina & Yair Tauman & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 2013. "Entry and espionage with noisy signals," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0113, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
  2. Yair Tauman & Alex Barrachina, 2012. "Industrial Espionage with a Noisy Intelligence," Department of Economics Working Papers 12-06, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.

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