Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies

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Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies

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Sudipta Sarangi ()
Pascal Billand ()
Christophe Bravard ()
S. Chakrabarti ()

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Sudipta Sarangi

Abstract

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolis- tic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Louisiana State University in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2009-11.

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Handle: RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2009-11

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Goyal, S. & Joshi, S., 1999. "Networks for Collaboration in Oligopoly," Papers 9952/a, Erasmus University of Rotterdam - Econometric Institute.
- Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-092/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
- S. Goyal & S. Joshi, 1999. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Econometric Institute Report 175, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute. [Downloadable!]
Billand, P. & Bravard, C., 2004. "Non-cooperative networks in oligopolies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 593-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.

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