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The Differential Impact of Accurate Product Cost Information in Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation

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  • CAROLYN M. CALLAHAN
  • E. ANN GABRIEL

Abstract

Many researchers claim that costing systems that provide materially more accurate or precise cost reports have a strict value†enhancing effect on decisions (i.e., Cooper 1988, 1995; Cooper and Kaplan 1991; Christensen and Sharp 1994; Rogers. Comstock. and Pritz 1994; Swenson 1995; Gupta and King 1997). However, this study provides theoretical and empirical evidence that the value of more accurate cost information may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure, as well as the firm's product market strategy. We extend the theoretical work of Gal†Or 1986 to incorporate an endogenous imprecise cost signal in two imperfect market structures: Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with imperfectly substitutable products. In addition, we theoretically link market structure to product market strategy. To examine product market strategy, we employ a laboratory markets design that allows for strategic reaction by a rival firm in each of these markets, because the competitive position of a firm is determined by its capacity to produce at low cost, or to differentiate its product from other products (Porter 1985). Consistent with our theoretical work, we argue that firms that compete on the basis of cost leadership (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Cournot competition), benefit through increased profits from increased product cost accuracy, whereas firms that compete on the basis of product differentiation (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Benrand competition) do not benefit from such increased product cost accuracy. Our results are consistent with this contention. That is, profit is higher in the experimental cost leadership markets (operationalized as Cournot markets) when subjects know their true cost, while profit is higher in the experimental product differentiation markets (operationalized as Bertrand markets) when subjects receive uninformative cost reports and make their decisions based on expected costs. These results suggest that the value of more accurate cost reports may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure strategy and product market strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Carolyn M. Callahan & E. Ann Gabriel, 1998. "The Differential Impact of Accurate Product Cost Information in Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 419-455, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:419-455
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb00566.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Muhammad Rosni b. Amir Hussin Author_Email: mohdrosni@uum.edu.my, 2011. "Cost Management Knowledge In The Entrepreneurship Training Programme In Malaysia," Annual Summit on Business and Entrepreneurial Studies (ASBES 2011) Proceeding 2011-049-135, Conference Master Resources.
    4. Luft, Joan & Shields, Michael D., 2003. "Mapping management accounting: graphics and guidelines for theory-consistent empirical research," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 169-249.
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