This paper aims to provide new light on a famous episode in financial history, the so called Baring crisis. Taking a microeconomic approach, this paper addresses issues that were not emphasized in traditional explanations of the crisis. We analyze borrowing costs in the 1880s using new data from debt contracts. We argue that, despite a worsening macroeconomic situation in Argentina, its Government continued to have capital market access besides decreasing borrowing costs. This paper suggests that competition between financial intermediaries was a main cause behind the crisis.
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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones in its series Working Papers in Economic History with number
wp07-01.
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