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Informational spillovers in the pre-1914 London Sovereign Debt Market

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Author Info
Marcelo de Paiva Abreu () (Department of Economics, PUC-Rio)
João Manoel Pinho de Mello () (Department of Economics, PUC-Rio)
Anônio de A. Sodré () (Department of Economics, PUC-Rio)

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Abstract

We document a novel type of international financial contagion whose driving force is shared financial intermediation. In the London peripheral sovereign debt market during pre-1914 period financial intermediation played a major informational role to investors, most likely because of the absence of international monitoring agencies and the substantial agency costs. Using two events of financial distress – the Brazilian Funding Loan of 1898 and the Greek Funding Loan of 1893 – as quasi-natural experiments, we document that, following the crises, the bond prices of countries with no meaningful economic links to the distressed countries, but shared the same financial intermediary, suffered a reduction relative to the rest of the market. This result is true for the mean, median and the whole distribution of bond prices, and robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis. We interpret this as evidence that the identity of the financial intermediary was informative, i.e, investors extracted information about the soundness of a debtor based on the performance of her financial intermediary. This spillover, informational in essence, arises as the flip-side of the relational lending coin: contagion arises for the same reason why relational finance (in this case, underwriting) helps alleviate informational and incentive problems,

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Paper provided by Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil) in its series Textos para discussão with number 552.

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Length: 49p
Date of creation: Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:rio:texdis:552

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  1. Kristin J. Forbes & Roberto Rigobon, 2002. "No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock Market Comovements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 2223-2261, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Juan-Huitzi Flores, 2007. "Lending Booms, Underwriting and Competition: The Baring Crisis Revisited," Working Papers in Economic History wp07-01, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones. [Downloadable!]
  3. Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 1998. "On crises, contagion, and confusion," MPRA Paper 13709, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-81, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1994. "Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 899-920, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Paolo Mauro & Yishay Yafeh, 2003. "The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders," IMF Working Papers 03/107, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Caroline van Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder, 2000. "Spillovers Through Banking Centers - A Panel Data Analysis," IMF Working Papers 00/88, International Monetary Fund.
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