Vertical Integration, Innovation and Foreclosure
AbstractThis paper studies the potential effects of vertical integration on downstream firms' incentives to innovate. Interacting efficiently with a supplier may require information exchanges, which raises the concern that sensitive information may be disclosed to rivals. This may be particularly harmful in case of innovative activities, as it increases the risk of imitation. We show that vertical integration exacerbates this threat of imitation, which de facto degrades the integrated supplier's ability to interact with unintegrated competitors. Vertical integration may thus lead to input foreclosure, thereby raising rivals' cost and limiting both upstream competition and downstream innovation. A similar concern of customer foreclosure arises in the case of downstream bottlenecks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2011-17.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
vertical integration; foreclosure; innovation; imitation; firewall;
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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