R&D Incentives in Vertically Related Markets
AbstractThis paper focuses on incentives to invest in research and development (R&D) in vertically related markets. In a bilateral duopoly setup, we consider how process R&D incentives of the firms in both upstream and downstream market depend on the intensity of simultaneous interbrand and intrabrand competition. Among the results: both interbrand and intrabrand competition have twofold effects on R&D incentives. Existence of a vertically related market with imperfect competition lowers both the incentives to invest in process R&D and the competitive advantage through the R&D investment. We will show how the impact of a firm's R&D investments in either market on consumer surplus as well as on the profits of all firms in both markets depends on exogenous parameters.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201307.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
research and development; vertical relations; bilateral oligopoly; product differentiation; process innovation; interbrand and intrabrand competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-03-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2013-03-09 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-IND-2013-03-09 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2013-03-09 (Innovation)
- NEP-TID-2013-03-09 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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