Modelling structural changes in the volatility process
AbstractThe tension between cooperation and competition that characterizes many business relationships is experimentally studied in a “pie”-creation game; value is created and increased through cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. At the end, the player with the greater stake in the joint pie decides on the division of the pie. Three treatments of the pie-creation game are considered: in the first treatment, rivals create the pie; in the second, non-rivals create the pie; finally, in the third, the pie is created by subjects who do not know about the future pie-division. The data show that the competition for the right to split the pie biases behaviors towards defection when subjects play with their rival.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg in its series LSF Research Working Paper Series with number 10-07.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
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Competition; cooperation; co-opetition; ambiguously repeated prisoner’s dilemma; experimental economics.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-08-06 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-08-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ETS-2010-08-06 (Econometric Time Series)
- NEP-EXP-2010-08-06 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Thomas W. Ross, 1992.
"Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games,"
0036, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Cooper, Russell & DeJong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W., 1996. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 187-218, February.
- Cooper, R. & DeJong, D.W. & Ross, T.W., 1992. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Papers 36, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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