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Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions

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  • Vasconcelos, Helder
  • Brito, Duarte
  • Ribeiro, Ricardo

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial acquisitions involving pure financial interests and/or effective corporate control on prices, market shares,firm profits and consumer welfare. The proposed methodology can deal with differentiated products industries, with both direct and indirect partial ownership interests and nests full mergers (100% financial and control acquisitions) as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasconcelos, Helder & Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo, 2013. "Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9354, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9354
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Brito, Duarte & Osório, António & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2018. "Unilateral effects screens for partial horizontal acquisitions: The generalized HHI and GUPPI," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 127-189.
    2. Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2018. "Quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 108-149.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Demand estimation; Differentiated products; Oligopoly; Partial acquisitions; Unilateral effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C54 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Quantitative Policy Modeling
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco

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