Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Inderst, Roman
  • Pfeil, Sebastian

Abstract

We analyze the interaction between financial institutions' internal compensation policy, the quality of loans, and their securitization decision. We also assess the case for requiring financial institutions to defer bonus pay so as to make incentives more commensurate with the longer-term risk of their transactions. While mandatory deferred compensation can improve the quality of loans, we also show when it has the opposite effect. We further analyze when mandatory deferred compensation can complement a policy that requires financial institutions to retain a minimum exposure to their originated loans, and we discuss the impact of a tax on short-term bonus pay. Generally, our modeling framework allows us to study the interaction of financial institutions' internal agency problems with the external agency problem that arises from securitization.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP8089.asp
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8089.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8089

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Compensation; Regulation; Securitization;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012. "The Credit Ratings Game," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, 02.
  2. Parlour, Christine & Plantin, Guillaume, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking ," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
  3. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000618, David K. Levine.
  4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, 2002. "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 9068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Keys, Benjamin J. & Mukherjee, Tanmoy & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2009. "Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 700-720, July.
  6. Steven R. Grenadier & Neng Wang, 2005. "Investment Timing, Agency, and Information," NBER Working Papers 11148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Chiesa, Gabriella, 2008. "Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 464-477, October.
  8. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the Organization of Delegated Expertise," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
  9. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, 2005. "Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/25, Center for Financial Studies.
  10. Rogerson, William P, 1997. "Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives: A Theory Explaining the Use of Economic Value Added as a Performance Measure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 770-95, August.
  11. Andrew Hertzberg & Jose Maria Liberti & Daniel Paravisini, 2010. "Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 795-828, 06.
  12. James M. Malcomson, 2009. "Principal and Expert Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 17.
  13. Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz & Victoria Ivashina, 2011. "Securitization without Adverse Selection: The Case of CLOs," NBER Working Papers 16766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Sumit Agarwal & Faye H. Wang, 2009. "Perverse incentives at the banks? Evidence from a natural experiment," Working Paper Series WP-09-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  15. Udell, Gregory F., 1989. "Loan quality, commercial loan review and loan officer contracting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 367-382, July.
  16. Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, 2009. "The future of securitisation: how to align incentives," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, September.
  17. Patrick Bolton & Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, 2010. "Executive compensation and risk taking," Staff Reports 456, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  18. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, 1985. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Staff Report 87, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  19. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Luc Laeven & Deniz Igan, 2008. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," IMF Working Papers 08/106, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Christine A. Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1291-1314, 06.
  21. Alan Morrison, 2000. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation and Investment Decisions," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe01, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  22. Debraj Ray, 2002. "The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 547-582, March.
  23. Alan D. Morrison, 2005. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 621-648, March.
  24. Acharya, Viral V & Volpin, Paolo, 2008. "Corporate Governance Externalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 6627, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. "Performance standards in incentive contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 245-278, December.
  26. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
  27. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362, February.
  28. Steven D. Levitt & Christopher M. Snyder, 1997. "Is No. News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 641-661, Winter.
  29. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1449-1496, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8089

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.