Genes, Legitimacy and Hypergamy: Another Look at the Economics of Marriage
AbstractIn order to credibly "sell" legitimate children to their spouse, women must forego more attractive mating opportunities. This paper derives the implications of this observation for the pattern of matching in marriage markets, the dynamics of human capital accumulation, and the evolution of the gene pool. A key consequence of the trade-off faced by women is that marriage markets will naturally tend to be hypergamous - that is, a marriage is more likely to be beneficial to both parties relative to remaining single, the greater the man’s human capital, and the lower the woman’s human capital. As a consequence, it is shown that the equilibrium can only be of two types. In the "Victorian" type, all agents marry somebody of the same rank in the distribution of income. In the "Sex and the City" (SATC) type, women marry men who are better ranked than themselves. There is a mass of unmarried men at the bottom of the distribution of human capital, and a mass of single women at the top of that distribution. It is shown that the economy switches from a Victorian to an SATC equilibrium as inequality goes up. The model sheds light on how marriage affects the returns to human capital for men and women. Absent marriage, these returns are larger for women than for men but the opposite may occur if marriage prevails. Finally, it is shown that the institution of marriage may or may not favour human capital accumulation depending on how genes affect one’s productivity at accumulating human capital.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6828.
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Other versions of this item:
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2009. "Genes, Legitimacy and Hypergamy: Another Look at the Economics of Marriage," IZA Discussion Papers 4456, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2008. "Genes, Legitimacy and Hypergamy: Another Look at the Economics of Marriage," IDEI Working Papers 509, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-HAP-2008-05-31 (Economics of Happiness)
- NEP-LAB-2008-05-31 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2008-05-31 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lena Edlund & Evelyn Korn, 2002. "A Theory of Prostitution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 181-214, February.
- Kremer, Michael, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-75, August.
- Galor, Oded & Zeira, Joseph, 1993.
"Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 35-52, January.
- Burdett, Ken & Coles, Melvyn G, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-68, February.
- Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
- Lena Edlund, 2005. "Sex and the City," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 25-44, 03.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Victoria, Sex and the City and why women get married
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-10-22 10:34:00
RePEc Biblio mentionsAs found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Motty Perry & Christian Ghiglino & Marco Francesconi, 2010.
"On the Origin of the Family,"
2010 Meeting Papers
581, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Francesconi, Marco & Ghiglino, Christian & Perry, Motty, 2009. "On the Origin of the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 4637, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Marco Francesconi & Christian Ghiglino & Motty Perry, 2010. "On the Origin of the Family," Discussion Paper Series dp534, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Marco Francesconi & Christian Ghiglino & Motty Perry, 2010. "On the Origin of the Family," Economics Discussion Papers 682, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Francesconi, Marco & Ghiglino, Christian & Perry, Motty, 2010. "On the Origin of the Family," CEPR Discussion Papers 7629, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bethmann & Michael Kvasnicka, 2011. "The institution of marriage," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 1005-1032, July.
- Francesconi, Marco & Ghiglino, Christian & Perry, Motty, 2013. "On the Origin of the Family," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1028, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Belot, Michèle & Fidrmuc, Jan, 2009.
"Anthropometry of Love: Height and Gender Asymmetries in Interethnic Marriages,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7146, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Belot, Michèle & Fidrmuc, Jan, 2010. "Anthropometry of love: Height and gender asymmetries in interethnic marriages," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 361-372, December.
- Michèle Belot & Jan Fidrmuc, 2009. "Anthropometry of Love Height and Gender Asymmetries in Interethnic Marriages," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp950, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Michèle Belot & Jan Fidrmuc, 2009. "Anthropometry of Love - Height and Gender Asymmetries in Interethnic Marriages," CESifo Working Paper Series 2846, CESifo Group Munich.
- Tomoki Fujii, 2012. "Dynamic Poverty Decomposition Analysis: An Application to the Philippines," Working Papers 34-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Brishti Guha, 2012. "Grandparents as Guards: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Inheritance and Post Marital Residence in a World of Uncertain Paternity," Working Papers 37-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.