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Monetary Policy and Lexicographic Preference Ordering

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  • Driffill, John
  • Rotondi, Zeno

Abstract

In this Paper we argue that the objectives given to the European Central Bank in the Maastricht Treaty are not well represented by the widely used weighted sum of squared deviations of inflation and output from target (plus possibly terms in squared changes in interest rates to pick up interest rate smoothing). Instead the stated lexicographic ordering should be taken at face value and its implications explored fully. We set out a number of models that do this, and comment on their implications.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4247.

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Date of creation: Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4247

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Keywords: european central bank; lexicographic preferences; monetary policy; time inconsistency;

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References

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  1. Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 1562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. von Hagen, J, 1995. "Inflation and Monetary Targeting in Germany," Papers 03, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies-.
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  4. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt15n3p5dt, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  6. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Price Stability as a Target for Monetary Policy: Defining and Maintaining Price Stability," Working Paper Series 91, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  7. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 5893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Frank Smets, 2000. "What horizon for price stability," Working Paper Series 24, European Central Bank.
  9. Laubach, T. & Posen, A.S., 1997. "Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland," Princeton Essays in International Economics 206, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  10. Alexius, Annika, 1999. "Inflation rules with consistent escape clauses," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 509-523, March.
  11. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
  12. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  13. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Zeno Rotondi & Giacomo Vaciago, 2007. "Lessons from the ECB experience: Frankfurt still matters!," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0070, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  2. Alberto Locarno, 2006. "Imperfect knowledge, adaptive learning and the bias against activist monetary policies," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 590, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  3. Q. Farooq Akram & Ragnar Nymoen, 2006. "Model selection for monetary policy analysis – Importance of empirical validity," Working Paper 2006/13, Norges Bank.
  4. Akram, Q. Farooq & Nymoen , Ragnar, 2007. "Model selection for monetary policy analysis How important is empirical validity?," Memorandum 14/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  5. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/6, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.

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