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Can Short-Term Capital Controls Promote Capital Inflows

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  • Cordella, Tito

Abstract

In an economy à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in reducing the vulnerability of emerging markets to financial crises may increase the volume of capital inflows.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2011.

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Date of creation: Nov 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2011

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Keywords: bank runs; Capital Controls; Capital Inflows; Herd Behaviour;

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References

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  1. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  2. Bernard Laurens & Jaime Cardoso, 1998. "Managing Capital Flows," IMF Working Papers 98/168, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-91, June.
  4. Jose De Gregorio & Sebastian Edwards & Rodrigo O. Valdes, 2000. "Controls on Capital Inflows: Do they Work?," NBER Working Papers 7645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Marcelo Soto & Salvador Valdés, 1996. "¿Es el Control Selectivo de Capitales Efectivo en Chile? Su Efecto sobre el Tipo de Cambio Real," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 33(98), pages 77-108.
  6. Eliana Cardoso & Ilan Goldfajn, 1998. "Capital Flows to Brazil: The Endogeneity of Capital Controls," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(1), pages 161-202, March.
  7. Ilan Goldfajn & Rodrigo O. Valdés, 1997. "Capital Flows and the Twin Crises," IMF Working Papers 97/87, International Monetary Fund.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hernán Rincón & Jorge Toro, . "Are Capital Controls and Central Bank Intervention Effective?," Borradores de Economia 625, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  2. Lambert, F. & Ramos-Tallada, J. & Rebillard, C., 2011. "Capital controls and spillover effects: evidence from Latin-American countries," Working papers 357, Banque de France.
  3. Bernardo S. de M. Carvalho & Márcio G.P. Garcia, 2006. "Ineffective Controls on Capital Inflows Under Sophisticated Financial Markets: Brazil in the Nineties," NBER Working Papers 12283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Boschi, Melisso & Goenka, Aditya, 2012. "Relative risk aversion and the transmission of financial crises," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 85-99.
  5. Antonio David, 2009. "Are price-based capital account regulations effective in developing countries?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(26), pages 3375-3388.
  6. Leonardo Villar & Hernán Rincón, 2000. "The Colombian Economy In The Nineties: Capital Flows And Foreign Exchange Regimes," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 003575, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  7. Melisso Boschi & Aditya Goenka, 2006. "Habit formation and the transmission of financial crises," Economics Discussion Papers 608, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  8. Jose De Gregorio & Sebastian Edwards & Rodrigo O. Valdes, 2000. "Controls on Capital Inflows: Do they Work?," NBER Working Papers 7645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Buch, Claudia M. & Heinrich, Ralph P. & Pierdzioch, Christian, 2001. "Globalisierung der Finanzmärkte: Freier Kapitalverkehr oder Tobin-Steuer?," Kiel Discussion Papers 381, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  10. Vithessonthi, Chaiporn & Tongurai, Jittima, 2013. "Unremunerated reserve requirements, exchange rate volatility, and firm value," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 358-378.

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