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International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents

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  • Horn, Henrik

Abstract

A sizeable literature analyzes the appropriate interpretation of FRAND commitments for standard-essential patents. With few exceptions, the literature disregards international dimensions, despite the fact that most standards are used in international markets. This paper uses a simple economic setting to assess pros and cons of the main jurisdictional bases in international law  the Territoriality and Nationality Principles when national regulatory authorities have conflicting preferences regarding the interpretation of FRAND commitments. The paper identifies situations where the bases can implement efficient outcomes, and where they fail. The paper also shows how non-discrimination obligations might improve upon the outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Horn, Henrik, 2022. "International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 14297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14297
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2015. "Standard-Essential Patents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(3), pages 547-586.
    2. Jay Pil Choi, 2016. "FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 233-250, July.
    3. Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-497, June.
    4. Gregor Langus & Vilen Lipatov & Damien Neven, 2013. "Standard-Essential Patents: Who Is Really Holding Up (And When)?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 253-284.
    5. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
    6. Bernhard Ganglmair & Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, 2012. "Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, June.
    7. Mario Mariniello & Damien Neven & Jorge Padilla, 2015. "Antitrust, regulatory capture and economic integration," Policy Contributions 891, Bruegel.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2023. "A theory of socially inefficient patent holdout," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 424-449, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Standard-essential patents; International jurisdiction; Default rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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