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International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents


  • Horn, Henrik

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))


Countries are alleged to pursue commercial interests through their antitrust interventions regarding FRAND commitments for standard-essential patents (SEPs). This paper examines pros and cons of allocating jurisdiction according to fundamental principles in international law, assuming that countries' regulations promote national objectives. It shows why the Territoriality Principle yields too lenient treatment of patent-issuing countries' SEPs, and too strict of treatment of other countries' SEPs, and why the Nationality Principle yields too lenient treatment generally. Non-discrimination obligations can, but need not, improve on outcomes. Hence, existing international law will typically not implement efficient outcomes, suggesting that an international agreement is required.

Suggested Citation

  • Horn, Henrik, 2020. "International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents," Working Paper Series 1314, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 13 Feb 2023.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1314

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jay Pil Choi, 2016. "FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 233-250, July.
    2. Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-497, June.
    3. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2015. "Standard-Essential Patents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(3), pages 547-586.
    4. Gregor Langus & Vilen Lipatov & Damien Neven, 2013. "Standard-Essential Patents: Who Is Really Holding Up (And When)?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 253-284.
    5. Mario Mariniello & Damien Neven & Jorge Padilla, 2015. "Antitrust, regulatory capture and economic integration," Policy Contributions 891, Bruegel.
    6. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
    7. Bernhard Ganglmair & Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, 2012. "Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2023. "A theory of socially inefficient patent holdout," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 424-449, April.

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    More about this item


    Standard-essential patents; International jurisdiction; Default rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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