International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents
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- Horn, Henrik, 2022. "International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 14297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Henrik Horn, 2023. "International Jurdisdiction Over Standard-Essential Patents," RSCAS Working Papers 2023/19, European University Institute.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2023.
"A theory of socially inefficient patent holdout,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 424-449, April.
- Llobet, Gerard & Padilla, Jorge, 2021. "A Theory of Socially-Inefficient Patent Holdout," CEPR Discussion Papers 16714, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Standard-essential patents; International jurisdiction; Default rules;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2020-02-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IPR-2020-02-17 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2020-02-17 (Law and Economics)
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