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The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives

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  • Edmans, Alex
  • Fang, Vivian
  • Huang, Allen

Abstract

This paper shows that short-term stock price concerns induce CEOs to take value-reducing actions. Vesting equity, our measure of short-term concerns, is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a merger and acquisition (M&A). When vesting equity increases, stock returns are more positive in the two quarters surrounding both repurchases and M&A, but more negative in the two years following repurchases and four years following M&A. These results are inconsistent with CEOs buying underpriced stocks or companies to maximize long-run shareholder value, but consistent with these actions being used to boost the short-term stock price and improve the conditions for equity sales. Overall, by identifying actions that carry clear value implications, this paper documents the long-term negative consequences of short-term incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Edmans, Alex & Fang, Vivian & Huang, Allen, 2017. "The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12305, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12305
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repurchases; Ceo incentives; Managerial myopia; Vesting; M&a; Short-termism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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