Executive Stock Options: Early Exercise Provisions and Risk-taking Incentives
AbstractTraditional executive stock option plans allow fixed numbers of options to vest peri-odically, independent of stock price performance. Because such options may climb deep in-the-money long before the manager can exercise them, they can exacerbate risk aversion in project selection. Making the proportion of options that vest a gradually increasing function of the stock price can ensure that appropriate numbers of options are retained while they provide risk-taking incentives, but are exercised once they have lost their convexity. "Progressive performance vesting" can allow the firm more efficiently to rebalance the manager's risk-taking incentives. Copyright 2006 by The American Finance Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 61 (2006)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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