Stock and Option Grants with Performance-based Vesting Provisions
AbstractWe assemble a sample of 983 equity-based awards that include either an accelerated- or a contingent-vesting provision tied to firm performance and explore the frequency, contractual nature, usage, and implications of such awards. We find that performance-vesting (p-v) provisions specify meaningful performance hurdles and provide significant incentives for executives. The propensity to use p-v provisions is positively related to the arrival of a new CEO and the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors and negatively related to prior stock performance. Performance-vesting firms have significantly better subsequent operating performance than control firms. Abnormal accounting performance does not arise from earnings management or discernible differences in financial or investment policy. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: email@example.com., Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 10 (October)
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