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La répartition des compétences en Europe Le double éclairage du droit et de l'économie

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  • Boyer, Robert
  • Dehove, Mario

Abstract

De multiples raisons plaident en faveur d'un réexamen de la répartition des compétences en Europe: complexité et perte d'efficacité des procédures, absence de légitimité vis-à-vis du citoyen, impact de l'élargissement et conséquences à long terme de l'euro. Du point de vue du droit, le principe de concurrence sur le grand marché a joué un rôle déterminant par ses effets propres et surtout le rôle d'entraînement concernant les normes techniques, la libre circulation, l'harmonisation de la fiscalité indirecte, la portabilité des droits sociaux. La théorie économique des biens publics traite plus de leur gestion que de leur émergence, ce qui peut expliquer l'écart entre les prédictions de la théorie et l'observation de la distribution effective des compétences. Les lacunes et incertitudes des théories de la justice et la persistance de fortes traditions nationales en matière de relations professionnelles et d'expression de la solidarité expliquent la difficulté d'une Europe sociale. Concernant le 'policy mix' européen, les déséquilibres et conflits qui ne manqueront pas de survenir appellent un gouvernement économique de la zone euro. L'analyse juridique souligne le rôle déterminant, dans tous les Etats fédéraux, du juge dont la jurisprudence procède à une délimitation des compétences et peut souligner la nécessité d'un réexamen de leur répartition par les pouvoirs politiques. S'impose donc une réforme des institutions européennes: anticipation des biens publics européens émergents associés à l'euro et au grand marché, clarification des procédures permettant un re-examen plus aisé de la répartition des compétences, création d'un exécutif léger susceptible de répondre à l'évènement et capable d'arbitrage entre objectifs et domaines de compétences.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyer, Robert & Dehove, Mario, 2003. "La répartition des compétences en Europe Le double éclairage du droit et de l'économie," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 0303, CEPREMAP.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:0303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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