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L'impact de la notation financière sur les stratégies de croissance externe

Author

Listed:
  • Francois Lantin

    (Laboratoire de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon)

  • Pierre Roy

    (MRM - Montpellier Research in Management - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - UM2 - Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School)

Abstract

Cette recherche vise à explorer une nouvelle piste de réflexion sur les comportements des grandes entreprises dans un contexte de financiarisation des stratégies. Elle s'attache ainsi à traiter une question de recherche inédite en Sciences de Gestion en mettant en lumière et en précisant le rôle des agences de notation financière dans les modalités de croissance externe des entreprises. La notation financière (ou rating) représente l'évaluation exprimée en lettres du risque de non remboursement d'un émetteur d'emprunt obligataire. La problématique retenue concerne l'impact d'une baisse potentielle de cette note sur les stratégies de rachat externe des firmes. Le traitement du cas empirique a été effectué sur la base de données secondaires quantitatives et qualitatives issues de bases de données économiques et financières et en ayant recours à la méthodologie de l'étude de cas et de l'étude d'événements. La réflexion engagée prend appui sur les récents événements intervenus au sein du secteur de l'acier et, en particulier, l'opposition entre Arcelor et ThyssenKrupp pour la prise de contrôle du canadien Dofasco au début de l'année 2006. L'analyse sectorielle et stratégique réalisée souligne l'importance et la pertinence du rachat pour ces deux firmes au regard des synergies visées, mais l'analyse financière, et notamment l'étude de la structure financière, montre à quel point l'opération aurait réduit la flexibilité financière de ThyssenKrupp. En réalisant sa propre analyse à la fois qualitative et quantitative, et en bénéficiant d'informations non publiques, l'agence de notation Standard and Poor's a joué un rôle déterminant. En effet, en menaçant officiellement de baisser sa note de crédit et de la faire basculer de la catégorie investissement à la catégorie spéculative, elle a conduit les dirigeants de ThyssenKrupp à ne pas s'aligner une nouvelle fois sur la proposition d'Arcelor. Enfin, l'analyse des réactions du marché boursier aux annonces des agences de notation nous conduit à mieux comprendre le rôle joué par ces nouveaux acteurs, et à justifier leur existence même au travers du cas d'une annonce de rachat puisqu'ils permettent à tous les investisseurs de connaître à l'avance l'impact financier de cette opération.

Suggested Citation

  • Francois Lantin & Pierre Roy, 2007. "L'impact de la notation financière sur les stratégies de croissance externe," Post-Print halshs-00692570, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00692570
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00692570
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    References listed on IDEAS

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